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Abstract
Plausible responsiveness to scope is a question of economic significance, in addition to statistical significance, of the 
scope test in contingent valuation. We briefly review the history of the scope test in order to place the current issue in the 
context of the BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill. As a result of the review we gain insights into how the issue of scope 
“adequacy” arose twenty years after it was first mentioned by the NOAA Panel on Contingent Valuation following the 
Exxon Valdez oil spill. We then provide a review of Desvousges, Mathews and Train (2012) who promote the adding-up 
test to identify inadequate responsiveness to scope adequacy. The adding-up test is a test of the construct validity of the 
contingent valuation method but is flawed as a measure of economic significance. We propose scope elasticity of 
willingness-to-pay as a measure of economic significance. A simulation suggests a likely range of elasticity estimates 
given linear and quadratic functional forms for the willingness-to-pay function. In order to illustrate the ease of 
implementation of scope elasticity within the context of the standard scope test we calculate scope elasticity with 
willingness-to-pay estimates from several studies, describe two studies that directly estimate scope elasticity and estimate 
scope elasticity with primary data from two studies. All of these empirical estimates of scope elasticity fall within the 
range of scope elasticity suggested by the simulation. Scope elasticity provides a practical way forward, relative to the 
adding up test, on the issue of economic significance of scope effects.
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Adding up test1. Introduction
Stated preference surveys that use the contingent valuation method
(CVM) elicit willingness-to-pay under various scenarios. One scenario
is to vary the scope of environmental quality or natural resource
allocation. The scope test is important in contingent valuation for two
important reasons. Most practically, in theory but not often in practice,
it can be used to estimate the total benefit curve. Smith (1984) makes
the point that benefit–cost analysis in practice rarely identifies the
policy level for net benefit maximization. Similarly, the CVM can be
used to estimate benefits for a single policy level and these can be
compared to costs. But implementation of the scope test can be used
to determine the most efficient level of policy. Given a total cost curve,
the total benefit (i.e., willingness-to-pay) curve could be used to
estimate the optimal level of environmental quality or natural resource
allocation instead of identifying levels that are more or less efficient
than the status quo (e.g., Lindhjem et al., 2015).
The scope test is also an important construct validity test.
Willingness-to-pay should be non-decreasing in the scope of environ-
ment quality or quantity of the natural resource allocation. Responsive-
ness to scope indicates that stated preferences conform to economic
theory and lends validity to the CVM. On the other hand, failure of the
scope test does not invalidate the CVM. The scope test is not a “cruciale for helpful comments.experiment” (Randall, 1998) and failure could be due to diminishing
marginal utility, substitution, behavioral anomalies, a poorly designed
and/or executed survey or small sample sizes that reduce the power
of the test. Any study should be assessed with a variety of validity and
reliability tests (Whitehead and Haab, 2013).
The NOAA Panel on Contingent Valuation (Arrow et al., 1993) stated
that demonstration of “adequate” scope effects should be required for
reliable measurement of willingness-to-pay for natural resource dam-
age assessment. Desvousges et al. (2012) consider the adding-up test
to be an adequacy test. The purpose of this paper is to reframe the
issue of scope sensitivity as one of economic significance and propose
scope elasticity as an alternative to the adding up test. We first briefly
review the history of the scope test in the context of the Exxon Valdez
and BP Deepwater Horizon oil spills. We next consider the adding-up
test and provide a critique of Desvousges et al. (2012). We derive
scope elasticity for two functional forms and conduct a Monte Carlo
simulation to suggest a likely range. We provide a number of empirical
examples to show the ease of implementation and understanding of
scope elasticity.
2. A Brief History of the Scope Test
Mitchell and Carson (1989) first described the scope test as “part–
whole bias.” While scope tests had been performed prior to
Mitchell and Carson, the controversy surrounding scope may have
begun with the Kahneman (1986) and Kahneman and Knetsch (1992)
“embedding” study. Kahneman and Knetsch (1992) find that
willingness-to-pay is no different when a good is valued by itself and
when it is valued as part of a larger bundle. Smith (1992) criticizes the
survey and study design of Kahneman and Knetsch (1992) which fell
short of best practice of the CVM.
Following the 1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill the state of Alaska
commissioned a study to estimate the lost passive use values due to
the spill with the intention to seek damages from Exxon. Carson et al.
(1992, 2003) conduct a number of validity and reliability tests but do
not conduct a scope test. In response, a team of researchers was assem-
bled with funding from Exxon to critically evaluate the CVM and two
volumes denouncing the contingent valuation method resulted
(Hausman, 1993, Desvousges et al., 2010). Among the papers that ulti-
mately appeared in journals, Boyle et al. (1994) for waterfowl, and
McFadden (1994) for wilderness areas, found that willingness-to-pay
was insensitive to scope. There has been much criticism of the water-
fowl and wilderness areas studies, including their inexpensive (at the
time) survey modes (telephone and mall-intercept), open-ended valu-
ation questions and small samples. Carson and Mitchell (1993) and
Carson (1997) reexamine the Exxon-funded data and find that it does
pass the scope test under certain conditions. Smith (1999) discusses
survey design problems with the waterfowl survey.
The Exxon Valdez oil spill launched what has become known as the
“CVM debate.” At the peak of the debate, the Journal of Economic
Perspectives published a three paper symposium on the CVM. Portney
(1994) introduced the issue and put it into context for economists
who were unfamiliar with nonmarket valuation. Diamond and
Hausman (1994), representing the “CVM critics,” review the anomalies
and inconsistencies found in some past studies and conclude that,
paraphrasing, no number is better than a CVM number. Internal scope
tests, which were common in the literature, were described as weak
by the CVM critics and split-sample external scope tests, also common
but overlooked,2 were described as strong tests and suggested as neces-
sary for reliable CVM surveys for natural resource damage assessments
(Diamond and Hausman, 1994). Hanemann (1994) argues against
many of the points made by Diamond and Hausman and critiques
Kahneman and Knetsch (1992) and Desvousges et al. (2010). Carson
and Mitchell (1995) clarified the terms embedding, part-whole bias
and internal and external scope tests. Many split-sample external tests
of the CVM were subsequently conducted (e.g., Whitehead et al.,
1998; Berrens et al., 2000).
Following the BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill, the Journal of
Environmental Perspectives published a second symposium on the
CVM. Kling et al. (2012) review the literature and conclude that
CVM studies, especially those conducted since the beginning of the
CVM debate, tend to pass the scope test. Carson (2012) reviews
evidence that CVM surveys tend to pass the scope test and survey
design issues that can lead to insensitivity to scope. Hausman
(2012) argues that since a few selected studies do not pass the
scope test and few studies have conducted an adding-up test, among
other issues, then the CVM is “hopeless.” Haab et al. (2013) comment
on Hausman (2012) by broadening the literature review and arguing
that most CVM studies, summarized in several meta-analyses, tend to
pass a scope test.3
3. Plausibility and the Adding Up Test
The NOAA Panel on Contingent Valuation (Arrow et al., 1993)
was established in 1991 to arbitrate between the views of the CVM
proponents and critics and develop a set of guidelines for the conduct
of the CVM for natural resource damage assessment. The NOAA Panel
described the scope test as a test of rationality: “Usually, though not
always, it is reasonable to suppose that more of something regarded2 See Carson (1997) on this point.
3 See Desvousges et al. (2016) and Haab et al. (2016) for a comment and reply.as good is better so long as an individual is not satiated. This is in general
translated into a willingness to pay somewhat more for more of a good,
as judged by the individual. Also, if marginal or incremental willingness
to pay for additional amounts does decline with the amount already
available, it is usually not reasonable to assume that it declines very
abruptly.” The NOAA Panel observed that some CVM studies fail to
pass this test: “Different but similar samples of respondents are asked
about their willingness to pay for prevention of environmental damage
scenarios that are identical except for their scale: different numbers of
seabirds saved, different numbers of forest tracts preserved from
logging, etc. It is reported that average willingness to pay is often
substantial for the smallest scenario presented but is then substantially
independent of the size of the damage averted, rising slightly if at all for
large changes in size.” In terms of guidance for future surveys they in-
cluded “inadequate responsiveness to the scope of the environmental
insult” as one item in a list of “maladies” that would render a CVM
survey unreliable. The burden of proof fell to the researcher.
The NOAA Panel left “inadequate” open to interpretation. In amemo
to the U.S. EPA, published in a report critical of NOAA guidelines for the
CVM, a subset of the NOAA panel, Arrow et al. (1994) attempted to clar-
ify adequacy when it had been confused with statistical significance:
“Had the panel thought that something as straightforward as statistical
measurability were the proper way to define sensitivity, thenwewould
(or should) have opted for language to that effect. A better word than
‘adequate’ would have been ‘plausible’: A survey instrument is judged
unreliable if it yields estimates which are implausibly unresponsive
to the scope of the insult. This, of course, is a judgment call, and
cannot be tested in a context-free manner ….” Arrow et al. (1994) left
“plausible” open to interpretation. Synonyms for adequate include
sufficient while synonyms for plausible includes believable. Sufficient
responsiveness to scope suggests a threshold that must be met by the
data. A believable scope effect is less restrictive, suggesting that the
magnitude should be within the realm of possibility. With either, con-
sideration of scope adequacy or plausibility is similar to the call to con-
sider economic significance in addition to statistical significance in all
fields of economics (McCloskey and Ziliak, 1996). While economists in
otherfieldswho enjoy large data setsmay be guilty of ignoring econom-
ic significance, CVM researchers routinely report the magnitude of
economic effects by presenting willingness-to-pay estimates that can
be judged on their plausibility or believability.
In the next sectionwe discuss howDesvousges et al. (2012) consider
the adding up test as a test of adequacy. Diamond (1996) provides an
example in his footnote 14: “As examples of possible adding-up tests,
consider variations on two recent surveys. Schulze et al. [11] used two
surveys to ask for WTP for partial and complete cleanups of the Upper
Clark Fork River Basin in Montana. For an adding-up test, a third survey
would describe a partial cleanup and describe the government as
already committed to it, with the costs to be borne as described in the
existing survey. The survey would then describe a complete cleanup
and ask for WTP to enhance the cleanup from partial to complete. The
mean WTP response from this question plus the mean WTP for partial
cleanup should be almost exactly the same as the mean WTP for
complete cleanup. One could test for the statistical significance of any
difference that was found.” Diamond (1996) formalized the adding-up
test in the context of the waterfowl and wilderness areas studies but
does not provide an empirical test.4 To understand the adding-up test,
consider goods A, B and C where A=B+C. A valuation study passes
the adding up test if WTPA=WTPB+WTPC. Due to substitution and in-
come effects, the adding up test must be implemented by separately
eliciting WTPA, WTPB and WTPC |B ,Y-TB where B indicates the amount
of B purchased, Y is income and TB is the cost of B. The empirical test is
for whether WTPA=WTPB+WTPC |B ,Y-TB. In contrast, a scope test is4 See Diamond et al. (1993) for an empirical test using thewilderness area data. It is not
clear why these results do not appear in Diamond (1996) but consider footnote 29 in
Hanemann (1994).
implemented by separately eliciting WTPA and WTPB and testing
whetherWTPANWTPB.
Base (e.g., partial cleanup) and scope (e.g., complete cleanup)
scenarios are generally straightforward to describe to survey respon-
dents. As described by Diamond (1996) developing the adding-up
scenario complicates survey development. First, it is an ex-post
counterfactual scenario. Respondents must be convinced that a
currently nonexistent government program has been funded and
implemented and that their budget has been reduced by the cost.
Second, the adding-up test raises survey costs. In order to develop
a convincing counterfactual, additional focus groups and pretesting
are necessary. Failure to pursue these additional survey develop-
ment tasks in order to provide a convincing counterfactual scenario
could lead to failure of the adding-up test. In addition to increased
survey development costs, the adding-up test increases survey
costs by adding another treatment that increases sample size.
Beyond the monetary costs, the adding-up test treatment imposes
an opportunity cost. The additional monetary costs could be
employed in an alternative scope treatment to elicit another point
on the total benefit curve, helping to identify the level of the policy
where net benefits are maximized.
One adding-up test appeared in the journal literature between
the time of the Exxon Valdez and BP Deepwater Horizon oil spills.
Bateman et al. (1997) elicit independent valuations of vouchers for a
restaurant meal and the two components of the meal (the main course
and coffee plus dessert) in a laboratory experiment. They follow an
adding-up test experimental design and find that the value of the two
components exceed the value of the whole, indicating part-whole bias
exists for well-known market goods. They conclude: “We have found
clear evidence of [part-whole bias] for private consumption goods,
bought and sold using incentive compatible mechanisms. Our results
suggest, contrary to most previous interpretations of [part-whole
bias], that this phenomenonmay not be attributable simply to problems
with the CV method, or with specific applications of that method.
Instead, it may be a symptom of some fundamental property of
individual's preferences which conventional consumer theory does
not allow for.” In a controlled laboratory environment the adding-up
test did not pass forwell-knownmarket goods and the authors interpret
the result as a behavioral anomaly (Bateman et al., 1997).5
4. Desvousges, Mathews and Train (2012)
Desvousges et al. (2012) review the scope effects literature and
classify studies based on whether they pass or fail the scope test based
on statistical significance. If all of the differences in scope published in
the study are statistically significant then the verdict is that the study
passes the scope test. If some of the tests pass, but not all, then the evi-
dence is consideredmixed. If none of the scope tests pass then the study
is classified as a fail. Of 109 studies, 36% pass the scope test, 15% fail the
test and 49% have mixed evidence. The classification system potentially
obscures a number of fine points. For example, Rollins and Lyke (1998)
explicitly test for diminishing marginal utility as the scope of the good
increases. They find sensitivity to scope at lower levels of provision of
the good and lack of sensitivity at higher levels of provision, as theory
suggests due to diminishing marginal value. Giraud et al. (1999)
find that their study passes a “strong” external (i.e., split-sample)
scope test but not a “weak” internal (i.e., paired comparison) test.
Whitehead and Cherry (2007) investigate different empirical models
with alternative hypothetical bias correction methods and find that
some specifications exhibit sensitivity to scope while others do not. In
each of these examples, it is more appropriate to classify the results as
pass, since a preferred specification passes the scope test and sensitivity
analysis is conducted to determinewhen the data does not pass the test.5 See also Elbakidze andNayga (2015) and Desvousges et al. (2015) for similar negative
results.While a full exploration is beyond the scope of this paper, other studies
where the scope test passed a statistical significance test in a preferred
specification may have been uncharitably labeled as “mixed” by
Desvousges et al. (2012). Their classification system results in an overly
pessimistic conclusion about the statistical significance of the scope test.
Next, Desvousges, Mathews and Train state that they: “… examined
all of the studies … to determine what, if anything, they reveal about
adequacy of response to scope. Amazingly, there is little information
to be obtained. In most studies, the original and reduced environmental
goods that are specified for the scope test differ in ways that prevent an
assessment of the magnitude of response.” They continue: “For exam-
ple, Berrens et al. (2000) find that the average value of saving one fish
species in one river is $57 while the value of saving 11 fish species in
four rivers is $74, which might appear to be inadequate response
(i.e., “look fishy”) but might also be the result of highly diminishing
marginal utility of saving fish.” In contrast to Desvousges et al. (2012)
use of the example, it shows how CVM studies typically provide the
information necessary to assess the economic significance of the
scope effect as we show below. Desvousges et al. (2012) do not
pursue a more systematic and detailed review to assess the economic
significance of the scope effect in previous studies.
Desvousges et al. (2012) then assert that the adding-up test is an
adequacy test: “… the hypothesis is tested of whether the sum of the
first two WTPs is equal to the third. The issue of adequacy is addressed
by this procedure, since the response to scope is inadequate if the sum
of the parts exceeds the whole.” Of the 109 scope studies, only three
provide enough information to meet the Desvousges et al. (2012)
requirements for testing scope adequacy. In two of these studies
adding-up is rejected. The third study is the Chapman et al. (2009)
natural resource damage assessment which conducted a CVM study
with only base and scope scenarios. In contrast to Diamond (1996)
who describes three different willingness-to-pay scenarios and explicit
discussion of payment (TB in the previous section) needed for an adding
up test, Desvousges et al. (2012) interpret Chapman et al. (2009) as con-
taining a base willingness-to-pay with incremental parts. Willingness-
to-pay in the adding up scenario (WTPC |B ,Y-TB in the previous section)
is inferred from the residual of the base and scope willingness-to-pay
estimates and Train (2012) assesses income effects statistically to
suggest that TB is not a factor. They argue that Chapman et al. (2009)
passes the scope test but does not pass their interpretation of the adding
up test.
Desvousges et al. (2012) conclude: “One thing seems clear to us.
The NOAA Panel was concerned with the possibility of ‘inadequate re-
sponsiveness to the scope of the environmental insult.’ The standard
scope test does not address this concern, since it tests for statistical sig-
nificance rather than adequacy of magnitude. In nearly all past applica-
tions of the test, the design of the study does not permit an evaluation of
adequacy. And in the one study that permits such an evaluation while
passing the standard scope test, the response to scope is demonstrably
inadequate — which shows that the standard scope test does not pro-
vide a reliable indicator of adequacy.”Desvousges et al. (2012) consider
the standard scope test a statistical significance test and equate failure of
the adding up test with scope inadequacy. This ignores information
available in many studies to assess the economic significance of the
scope test.
5. Scope Elasticity of Willingness-to-pay
Elasticity is often used to assess the plausibility of the change in one
economic variable in response to the change in another. For example,
an own-price elasticity of demand equal to zero indicates a vertical
demand curve and violation of the principle of demand. Any positive
own-price elasticity (in absolute value) is a plausible demand curve.
Economists routinely refer to “inelastic” demand and attempt to find
the economic factors responsible for the limited response (e.g., few
substitutes, small budget share, short run time period). Similarly,
given a willingness-to-pay function, WTP(Q),scope point elasticity of
willingness-to-pay could be measured as εQ ¼ dWTPdQ QWTP, where Q is a
quantitative measure of scope change.6 Many CVM studies include
only base and scope scenarios, which is not enough split sample
treatments to estimate a continuous willingness-to-pay function and






P; where the horizontal bar represents the midpoint of a line
segment.
With typical willingness-to-pay functions it can be expected that
scope elasticity will range from zero to one. Consider the linear
functional form with constant marginal value, WTP=a+bQ, where
a≥0, b≥0 and scope elasticity is 0≤ bQaþbQ ≤1. The elasticity is equal
to one if a=0 and is less than one if aN0.7 Studies that find a statis-
tically insignificant scope effect, b=0, will have scope elasticity
equal to zero. The quadratic functional form allows diminishing
marginal value: WTP= c+dQ+ eQ2, where c≥0, d≥0, e≤0 and
scope elasticity is 0≤ dQþ2eQ
2
cþdQþeQ2 b1 .
8 With statistically significant
scope effects and diminishing marginal value, dN0 , eb0, scope
elasticity is always less than one since 2ebc+e. In order to better
understand the likely range of scope elasticity with these two func-
tional forms we conduct a Monte Carlo simulation where a ,b , c ,d
and Q are randomly drawn from a uniform distribution that ranges
from 1 to 100 and e is randomly drawn from a uniform distribution
that ranges from −0.00005 to −0.005. The mean WTP is 2637 and
2889 with the linear and quadratic functional forms over 1000 ran-
dom draws. The mean scope elasticity is 0.927 with a 95% confidence
interval of 0.630 and 0.998 with the linear functional form. The mean
scope elasticity with the quadratic functional form is 0.708 with a
95% confidence interval of 0.177 and 0.971. This simulation is not
conclusive but it does suggest the range of plausible elasticities
that might be expected from willingness-to-pay functions with sta-
tistically significant scope effects.
Considering the Berrens et al. (2000) “fishy” example from
Desvousges et al. (2012) mentioned above the scope arc elasticity
is 0.16 if the number of protected fish species is the relevant quantity.9
If the number of rivers with protected in-stream flows is the
relevant quantity, the scope arc elasticity is 0:22 ¼ ð745741 Þð ð4þ1Þ⁄2ð74þ57Þ=2Þ .
Desvousges et al. (2012) employ the Turnbull estimator which gener-
ates the smallest difference in willingness-to-pay from Berrens et al.
(2000). The median willingness-to-pay from three parametric models
is “approximately” $25 and $55 for one fish (one river) and eleven
fish (four rivers). If these willingness-to-pay estimates are used then
the scope arc elasticities are 0.45 and 0.63 when fish and rivers are
the relevant quantities.
The plausibility of the scope effect can be assessed for many studies
in the literature. For example, consider three recently published studies.
Lindhjem et al. (2015) find statistically significant differences in
willingness-to-pay for an increase in preserved forests from a 1.4%
baseline to 2.8% and from 1.4% to 10%. Willingness to pay for the
increase to 2.8% is $693 and willingness-to-pay for the increase to 10%
is $871. The scope arc elasticity is 0.20. Martin‐Ortega et al. (2015),
examining ordering effects, find statistically significant differences in
willingness-to-pay for an increase in water reliability from 50% to 90%.6 Amiran andHagen (2010) develop a formalmodel of scopewith bounded utility func-
tions and show that relatively small scope effects are not inconsistent with economic the-
ory. The size of the scope effect in their model depends explicitly on the substitutability
between market and nonmarket goods.
7 Carson (1997) estimates a willingness-to-pay model with the 10% trimmed wilder-
ness area data from Diamond et al. (1993) and finds that scope elasticity, as defined here,
is equal to one.
8 In footnote 5Diamond (1996) suggests thatmarginal willingness-to-pay should be in-
creasing in scope suggesting an elasticity greater than one. Hanemann (1994) addresses
this by critiquing Diamond's assumptions.
9 The calculation is 0:16 ¼ ð7457111 Þð ð11þ1Þ⁄2ð74þ57Þ=2Þ.Willingness-to-pay for a 50% increase in two ordering scenarios is $46
and $50 and willingness-to-pay for a 90% increase is $77 and $72.
The scope arc elasticities are 0.88 and 0.63. Longo et al. (2015), also
examining ordering effects, estimate the value of reducing greenhouse
gas emissions from three policies that have different effectiveness.
The Turnbull willingness-to-pay estimates are $62, $99 and $152 for
reductions of 0.5%, 4% and 16% in one sequence of valuation
questions and $49, $89 and $109 in another sequence. Scope elasticity
of willingness-to-pay ranges from 0.15 to 0.35.
Two studies provide estimates of scope elasticity in their willingness-
to-pay models. Richardson and Loomis (2009) consider the scope effect
with secondary CVM data in a meta-analysis of 67 willingness-to-pay
estimates of threatened and endangered species protection. They find
that themagnitude of the scope effect is a statistically significant determi-
nant of willingness-to-pay. The linear “full model for benefit transfer”
(Table 5) scope elasticity is 0.27 with a 95% confidence interval of 0.03
to 0.51. The scope elasticity from the double log “full model for benefit
transfer,” which has a better statistical fit, is 0.71 with a 95% confidence
interval of 0.38 and 1.04. Metcalfe et al. (2012) estimate the value of
water quality improvements in England and Wales with primary data.
The scope treatments are estimated with the existing water quality as
the base and two randomly assigned improvements. The scope elasticity
is 0.68 with a 95% confidence interval of 0.14 to 1.22. In a model with
covariates the scope elasticity is 0.51 with a 95% confidence interval of
−0.09 to 1.11. The discussion in Metcalfe et al. (2012) implies that this
result is plausible.
In order to estimate scope elasticitywith CVMdata, we consider two
data sets from the scope test literature reviewed by Desvousges et al.
(2012). First, Banzhaf et al. (2006) estimate the benefits of improved
water quality in Adirondack State Park to New York state residents.
We construct the data from Table 4 found in a preliminary version of
the paper (Banzhaf et al., 2004).Weuse the data from the four bid levels
with large sample sizes: $25, $90, $150 and $250.10 The levels of
environmental quality for the base and scope scenarios are 20% and
40% increase in “lakes that support fish in ten years.” The estimated
model is WTP=135+90Q, where Q is equal to one for a 40% increase
and zero otherwise.11 The arc elasticity is 0.76with a 95% confidence in-
terval of 0.42 and 1.10. Whitehead and Cherry (2007) elicited referen-
dum votes to four bid amounts ($5, $15, $30 and $50) and three levels
of air quality (health and visibility) improvement (2%, 10% and 20%).
The estimated double log model is lnWTP=1.18+0.56lnQ.12 The
scope elasticity is the coefficient on the scope variable, 0.56, with a
95% confidence interval of 0.055 and 1.06.6. Conclusions
The adding-up test is a useful construct validity test but very few
researchers have chosen to employ it. The reasons may include that it
has higher costs and lower benefits relative to a basic scope test. The
adding-up test is less useful for determining if scope effects are
plausible. A test for plausibility is a test for economic significance
that should be assessed with changes in the magnitude of willingness-
to-pay relative to changes in the magnitude of the scope variable. We
propose scope elasticity of willingness-to-pay as a measure of the
economic significance of scope that can be compared across studies to10 Wedonot use 50 base case observations at three bid values ($35, $85, $200). There are
no observations with the scope scenario with these bid values.
11 Willingness-to-pay and scope elasticity are estimatedwith the censored probit model
and the standard errors are estimated with the Delta Method (Cameron and James, 1987;
Cameron, 1991). Each of the censored probit coefficient estimates are statistically signifi-
cant. These results are available upon request.
12 Willingness-to-pay and scope elasticity are estimatedwith the censored probit model
and the standard errors are estimated with the Delta Method (Cameron and James, 1987;
Cameron, 1991). Each of the coefficient estimates are statistically significant. The double
log model generates the best statistical fit. The scope elasticity from linear and quadratic
models is not statistically different from one. These results are available upon request.
assess plausibility. Scope elasticity is a straightforward measure of
economic significance and many existing studies will contain the
necessary information. We examine scope elasticity from a number
of existing studies and find that in each study scope elasticity is with-
in a range suggested by a simulation. Where confidence intervals can
be developed, scope elasticity is statistically different from zero but
not statistically different from one. While our sample of studies is
purposively small, all of the estimates exhibit plausible responsive-
ness to scope.
CVM studies that pass the scope test produce results that are most
useful for policy analysis. CVM studies that do not pass the scope test
should be critically examined for behavioral anomalies (Heberlein
et al., 2005) and other issues before the CVM is determined to be a
valuation method that cannot measure preferences. One step in
this direction is to conduct a more thorough review of scope effect
literature. Similar to Richardson and Loomis (2009), a meta-
analysis should be performed with a secondary data set that includes
as the dependent variable the magnitude of willingness-to-pay for
each of the scope levels considered in each study. The other indepen-
dent variables should include study characteristics such as valuation
question format, survey mode, quantitative or qualitative descrip-
tions of scope, use of visual aids, geographic, temporal or other vari-
ant of scope and other standard control variables. Relative to
Desvousges et al. (2012) review that focuses on statistical signifi-
cance and the adding up test, this is the sort of study needed to
fully assess the conditions under which the magnitude of scope ef-
fects are plausible.References
Amiran, Edoh Y., Hagen, Daniel A., 2010. The scope trials: variation in sensitivity to scope
andWTPwith directionally bounded utility functions. J. Environ. Econ. Manag. 59 (3),
293–301.
Arrow, Kenneth, Solow, Robert, Portney, Paul R., Leamer, Edward E., Radner, Roy,
Schuman, Howard, 1993. Report of the NOAA Panel on Contingent Valuation.
Arrow, Kenneth, Leamer, Edward E., Schuman, Howard, Solow, Robert, 1994. Appendix D
in “Comments on Proposed NOAA/DOI Regulations on Natural Resource Damage
Assessment. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (October).
Banzhaf, Spencer, Burtraw, Dallas, Evans, David, Krupnick, Alan, 2004. Valuation of
Natural Resource Improvements in the Adirondacks. Resources for the Future
(September).
Banzhaf, H. Spencer, Burtraw, Dallas, Evans, David, Krupnick, Alan, 2006. Valuation of
natural resource improvements in the Adirondacks. Land Econ. 82 (3), 445–464.
Bateman, Ian, Munro, Alistair, Rhodes, Bruce, Starmer, Chris, Sugden, Robert, 1997. Does
part–whole bias exist? An experimental investigation. Econ. J. 107 (441), 322–332.
Berrens, Robert P., Bohara, Alok K., Silva, Carol L., Brookshire, D., Mckee, Michael, 2000.
Contingent values for New Mexico instream flows: with tests of scope, group-size
reminder and temporal reliability. J. Environ. Manag. 58 (1), 73–90.
Boyle, Kevin J., Desvousges, William H., Johnson, F. Reed, Dunford, Richard W., Hudson,
Sara P., 1994. An investigation of part-whole biases in contingent-valuation studies.
J. Environ. Econ. Manag. 27 (1), 64–83.
Cameron, Trudy Ann, 1991. Interval estimates of non-market resource values from refer-
endum contingent valuation surveys. Land Econ. 67 (4), 413–421.
Cameron, Trudy Ann, James, Michelle D., 1987. Efficient estimation methods for "closed-
ended" contingent valuation surveys. Rev. Econ. Stat. 269–276.
Carson, Richard T., 1997. Contingent valuation surveys and tests of insensitivity to
scope. In: Kopp, R.J., Pommerehne, W.W., Schwarz, N. (Eds.), Chapter 6 (Pages
101–125) in Determining the Value of Non-marketed Goods: Economic,
Psychological, and Policy Relevant Aspects of Contingent Valuation Methods.
Springer, Netherlands.
Carson, Richard T., 2012. Contingent valuation: a practical alternative when prices aren't
available. J. Econ. Perspect. 26 (4), 27–42.
Carson, Richard T., Mitchell, Robert Cameron, 1993. The issue of scope in contingent
valuation studies. Am. J. Agric. Econ. 75 (5), 1263–1267.
Carson, Richard T., Mitchell, Robert Cameron, 1995. Sequencing and nesting in contingent
valuation surveys. J. Environ. Econ. Manag. 28 (2), 155–173.
Carson, Richard T., Mitchell, Robert C., Hanemann, W. Michael, Kopp, Raymond J., Presser,
Stanley, Ruud, Paul A., 1992. A Contingent Valuation Study of Lost Passive Use
Values Resulting From the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill. No. 6984. University Library
of Munich, Germany.
Carson, Richard T., Mitchell, Robert C., Hanemann, Michael, Kopp, Raymond J., Presser,
Stanley, Ruud, Paul A., 2003. Contingent valuation and lost passive use: damages
from the Exxon Valdez oil spill. Environ. Resour. Econ. 25 (3), 257–286.
Chapman, D., Bishop, R., Hanemann, W., Kanninen, B., Krosnick, J., Morey, E., Tourangeau,
T., 2009. Natural resource damages associated with aesthetic and ecosystem injuries
to Oklahoma’s Illinois river system and Tenkiller Lake, expert report for State ofOklahoma, in Case No. 05-CV-0329-GKF-SAJ State of Oklahoma v. Tyson Foods., et al.
(In the United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma.).
Desvousges, W.H., Johnson, F.R., Dunford, R.W., Boyle, K.J., Hudson, S.P., Wilson, K.N.,
2010. Measuring Nonuse Damages Using Contingent Valuation: An Experimental
Evaluation of Accuracy. second ed. RTI Press Publication No. BK-0001-1009RTI
International, Research Triangle Park, NC.
Desvousges, William, Mathews, Kristy, Train, Kenneth, 2012. Adequate responsiveness to
scope in contingent valuation. Ecol. Econ. 84, 121–128 (December).
Desvousges, William, Mathews, Kristy, Train, Kenneth, 2015. An adding-up test on
contingent valuations of river and lake quality. Land Econ. 91, 556–571
(August).
Desvousges, William, Mathews, Kristy, Train, Kenneth, 2016. From curious to pragmati-
cally curious: comment on “From hopeless to curious? Thoughts on Hausman's
‘dubious to hopeless’ critique of contingent valuation”. Appl. Econ. Perspect. Policy
38 (1), 174–182.
Diamond, Peter A., 1996. Testing the internal consistency of contingent valuation surveys.
J. Environ. Econ. Manag. 30, 337–347.
Diamond, Peter A., Hausman, Jerry A., 1994. Contingent valuation: is some number better
than no number? J. Econ. Perspect. 8 (4), 45–64.
Diamond, Peter A., Hausman, Jerry A., Leonard, Gregory K., Denning, Mike A., 1993.
Does contingent valuation measure preferences? Experimental evidence. In:
Hausman, J.A. (Ed.), Contingent Valuation, A Critical Assessment. Elsevier,
Amsterdam, pp. 41–89.
Elbakidze, L., Nayga, R., 2015. Validating consistency of non-hypothetical experimental
auction data: application of the adding-up test in a multi-unit setting. Selected
Paper Prepared for Presentation at the Agricultural & Applied Economics Association's
Annual Meeting, San Francisco, CA.
Giraud, K.L., Loomis, John B., Johnson, R.L., 1999. Internal and external scope in
willingness-to-pay estimates for threatened and endangered wildlife. J. Environ.
Manag. 56 (3), 221–229.
Haab, Timothy C., Interis, Matthew G., Petrolia, Daniel R., Whitehead, John C., 2013.
From hopeless to curious? Thoughts on Hausman's ‘dubious to hopeless’ critique of
contingent valuation. Appl. Econ. Perspect. Policy 35 (4), 593–612.
Haab, Timothy C., Interis, Matthew G., Petrolia, Daniel R., Whitehead, John C., 2016.
Interesting questions worthy of further study: our reply to Desvousges, Mathews,
and Train's (2015) comment on our thoughts (2013) on Hausman's (2012) update
of diamond and Hausman's (1994) critique of contingent valuation. Appl. Econ.
Perspect. Policy 38 (1), 183–189.
Hanemann, W. Michael, 1994. Valuing the environment through contingent valuation.
J. Econ. Perspect. 8 (4), 19–43.
Hausman, Jerry A. (Ed.), 1993. Contingent valuation: a critical assessment. Elsevier.
Hausman, Jerry, 2012. Contingent valuation: from dubious to hopeless. J. Econ. Perspect.
26 (4), 43–56.
Heberlein, Thomas A., Wilson, Matthew A., Bishop, Richard C., Schaeffer, Nora Cate, 2005.
Rethinking the scope test as a criterion for validity in contingent valuation. J. Environ.
Econ. Manag. 50 (1), 1–22.
Kahneman, Daniel, 1986. Comments. In: Cummings, Ronald G., Brookshire, David S.,
Schulze, William D. (Eds.), Valuing Environmental Goods: An Assessment of the
Contingent Valuation Method. Rowman and Allanheld, Totowa, NJ.
Kahneman, Daniel, Knetsch, Jack L., 1992. Valuing public goods: the purchase of moral
satisfaction. J. Environ. Econ. Manag. 22 (1), 57–70.
Kling, Catherine L., Phaneuf, Daniel J., Zhao, Jinhua, 2012. From Exxon to BP: has some
number become better than no number? J. Econ. Perspect. 26 (4), 3–26.
Lindhjem, Henrik, Grimsrud, Kristine, Navrud, Ståle, Kolle, Stein Olav, 2015. The social
benefits and costs of preserving forest biodiversity and ecosystem services.
J. Environ. Econ. Policy 4 (2), 202–222.
Longo, Alberto, Hoyos, David, Markandya, Anil, 2015. Sequence effects in the valuation of
multiple environmental programs using the contingent valuationmethod. Land Econ.
91 (1), 20–35.
Martin‐Ortega, Julia, Mesa‐Jurado, M. Azahara, Berbel, Julio, 2015. Revisiting the impact of
order effects on sensitivity to scope: a contingent valuation of a common‐pool
resource. J. Agric. Econ. 66 (3), 705–726.
McCloskey, Deirdre N., Ziliak, Stephen T., 1996. The standard error of regressions. J. Econ.
Lit. 34 (1), 97–114.
McFadden, Daniel, 1994. Contingent valuation and social choice. Am. J. Agric. Econ. 76 (4),
689–708.
Metcalfe, Paul J., Baker, William, Andrews, Kevin, Atkinson, Giles, Bateman, Ian J.,
Butler, Sarah, Carson, Richard T., East, Jo, Gueron, Yves, Sheldon, Rob, Train,
Kenneth, 2012. An assessment of the nonmarket benefits of the Water
Framework Directive for households in England and Wales. Water Resour.
Res. 48 (3).
Mitchell, Robert, Carson, Richard, 1989. Using surveys to value public goods: the contin-
gent valuation method. Resources for the Future, Washington, D.C.
Portney, Paul R., 1994. The contingent valuation debate: why economists should care.
J. Econ. Perspect. 8 (3), 3–17.
Randall, Alan, 1998. Beyond the crucial experiment: mapping the performance character-
istics of contingent valuation. Resour. Energy Econ. 20 (2), 197–206.
Richardson, Leslie, Loomis, John, 2009. The total economic value of threatened,
endangered and rare species: an updated meta-analysis. Ecol. Econ. 68 (5),
1535–1548.
Rollins, Kimberly, Lyke, Audrey, 1998. The case for diminishingmarginal existence values.
J. Environ. Econ. Manag. 36 (3), 324–344.
Smith, V. Kerry, 1984. Environmental Policy Under Reagan's Executive Order: The Role of
Benefit–Cost Analysis.
Smith, V. Kerry, 1992. Arbitrary values, good causes, and premature verdicts. J. Environ.
Econ. Manag. 22 (1), 71–89.
Smith, V. Kerry, 1999. Of birds and books: more on hypothetical referenda. J. Polit. Econ.
107 (1), 197–200.
Train, Kenneth, 2012. Comments on Chapman et al. (2009): Inadequate Response to
Scope while Passing the Scope Test (January 24).
Whitehead, John C., Cherry, Todd L., 2007. Willingness-to-pay for a green energy
program: a comparison of ex-ante and ex-post hypothetical bias mitigation
approaches. Resour. Energy Econ. 29 (4), 247–261.Whitehead, John C., Haab, Timothy C., 2013. Contingent valuation method. In:
Shogren, Jason (Ed.), Encyclopedia of Energy, Natural Resource, and Environmental
Economics. Elsevier.
Whitehead, John C., Haab, Timothy C., Huang, Ju-Chin, 1998. Part-whole bias in contingent
valuation: will scope effects be detected with inexpensive survey methods? South.
Econ. J. 160–168.
